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Household Decision Making in Rural China: 
Using Experiments to Estimate the Influences of Spouses
* 
 
Many economic decisions are made jointly within households. This raises the question about 
spouses’ relative influence on joint decisions and the determinants of relative influence. 
Using a controlled experiment (on inter-temporal choice), we let each spouse first make 
individual decisions and then make joint decisions with the other spouse. We use a random 
parameter probit model to measure the relative influence of spouses on joint decisions. In 
general, husbands have a stronger influence than wives. However, in richer households and 
when the wife is older than the husband, we find a significantly stronger influence of the wife 
on joint decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
Many important economic decisions are made by households, implying joint rather than 
individual decisions. For example, decisions regarding labor supply, savings, and investments are 
often made jointly within the household. This implies that such decisions will be a function of the 
preferences of household members and the relative influence of each household member on the 
joint decisions. However, it is not straightforward to measure the relative influence of spouses on 
joint decisions. One often used approach has been to look at who is in control of the household 
income and correlate this with household behavior and outcomes.
1 However, this approach has its 
obvious limitations as a means to study the relative influence of spouses since with field data it is 
by definition difficult to obtain data on preferences/choices of the spouses and the joint 
household decisions. Therefore, an alternative and increasingly popular approach is to use 
experiments and survey methods to study household decision making, since they allow for 
collection of data for both individual and joint decisions under controlled conditions. This means 
that spouses first have to make individual choices on a series of tasks, after which they are united 
and have to make joint choices on the same or a similar set of tasks. By construction, the 
researchers then have both measures of the individual preferences and of the joint choices, and 
can thus explain the joint choices with the individual preferences. This approach has been used to 
study household decision making in many different domains, such as risk taking (Bateman and 
Munro, 2005; Iversen et al., 2006; Munro et al., 2008; de Palma et al., 2010), consumption 
choices (Arora and Allenby, 1999; Browning and Chiappori, 1998), behavior in social dilemma 
                                                 
1 For instance, Thomas (1994), Lundberg et al. (1997), Phipps and Burton (1998), Duflo (2003), and Qian (2008) 
find that, for instance, child health and survival rates, nutrition, expenditures for different goods and services (such as 
tobacco and child care), and the educational attainment of children depend strongly on whether the household 
income is controlled by the husband or the wife. 3 
 
situations (Cochard et al., 2010), and stated preferences (Quiggin, 1998; Dosman and 
Adamowicz, 2006; Strand, 2007; Beharry-Borg et al., 2009). 
In the present paper, we investigate the relative influences of husbands and wives on joint 
household decisions by conducting a high-stakes artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 
2004) in rural China. The experimental task is to make inter-temporal decisions in which spouses 
have to choose between earlier but smaller rewards and later but higher rewards. While 
investigating household decision making in inter-temporal choice is a contribution in itself – in 
particular since inter-temporal choices (e.g., on investments, education, farming) are very 
important for the development of poorer regions – our main contribution is that we develop a 
method for estimating the relative influence of husbands and wives. To achieve this, we build on 
earlier work by Dosman and Adamowicz (2006) and Beharry-Borg et al. (2009), who use 
hypothetical survey questions to study stated preferences, separately for each spouse and then 
jointly for the couple. They assume a bargaining model where the joint decision depends on a 
weighted average of the two spouses’ preferences. This is (unnecessarily) restrictive since it does 
not allow for the influence of other (socio-demographic) aspects and does not allow for the 
possibility that joint choices can be more extreme than those made by either of the spouses 
(something which can be expected to happen in some cases; see Mazzocco, 2004, or Eliaz et al., 
2006). Our approach is more general by using a random parameter model where we first estimate 
the preferences of each spouse from his/her individual choices. From these two models – 
respectively dealing with the husbands’ and wives’ individual choices – we then estimate the 
predicted probability of choosing an alternative from each choice situation of the experiment. By 
this way we can obtain a measure of the strength of the preferences of the spouses. These 
predicted probabilities are then included as explanatory variables in a model explaining the joint 
decisions. 4 
 
Our approach allows us to estimate the relative influence of husbands and wives and also 
what socio-demographic household characteristics affect this relative influence. We find that in 
90% of households, the husband has a stronger influence on household decisions than the wife. 
With respect to the factors determining the relative influences of husbands and wives, we are able 
to identify three important variables. Wives have a stronger influence on the joint decisions in 
high-income households and in households where the wife is older than the husband. The 
influence of wives is also stronger if the couple reports that the wife is in charge of small 
investment decisions in the household. The latter finding confirms earlier studies showing that it 
is important who controls the household income. The former findings, however, add to the 
literature the insight that the relative influence of husbands and wives depends also on important 
socio-demographic household characteristics. The random parameter modeling approach 
proposed here is suitable to detect these factors. Using this approach, together with eliciting the 
behavior of spouses and couples in an incentivized experiment, allows us to contribute to a better 
understanding of what drives household decision making. The outline of the paper is as follows: 
Section 2 introduces the experimental design and procedure, Section 3 presents the empirical 
model, Section 4 reports the experimental results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
2.1. Location of the experiment 
The experiment was conducted in October 2007 in several villages of Majiang County in the 
province of Guizhou, which is located in the southwestern part of China. The province is one of 
the least developed provinces in China, with inhabitants having on average 6.75 years of 5 
 
schooling and with a GDP per capita of 6,742 Chinese yuan (yuan hereafter) in 2007, which is 
equal to only 32% of the national average of 21,049 yuan (NBS, 2008). 
Seven villages from five townships were randomly chosen, and in each village, 10-24 
households with official marital status were randomly selected based on the official registration 
list provided by the local government. The number of households chosen in each village was 
proportional to the size of the village. The interviewers were sent to the households’ homes, and 
each household was first asked to answer a survey concerning farming and forestry issues. Then 
spouses could voluntarily choose to participate in the experiment. In order to prevent villagers 
from spreading the word about the experiment within a village, we employed 20 interviewers so 
that all experiments in a village were finished within a couple of hours. The experiment lasted for 
less than one hour for each household and the expected average individual payoff from the 
experiment was 30 yuan, which corresponds to an average payoff of roughly two days of paid 
work. This means that our experiment provided much greater incentives than a usual laboratory 
experiment. In total, 101 couples voluntarily participated in the experiment; no couple refused to 
participate.  
The socioeconomic characteristics of the sampled households are shown in Table 1. The 
average yearly per capita income is 4,203 yuan. Women contribute on average 42% of the total 
household income. Among the couples in our sample, the average length of marriage is 26 years, 
and the average number of children is 2.7.
2 
<Table 1 to be here> 
 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that the one-child policy only applies for the ethnic majority of Han. The county in which we 
conducted the experiment is an ethnic minority autonomous prefecture, meaning that many families in this region are 
not affected by the official one-child policy. This explains the relatively large number of children in our sample. 6 
 
2.2. Experimental design 
The time preference experiment consisted of 18 pair-wise choices as shown in Table 2. To avoid 
order effects, the subjects faced a randomized order of the choices in the experiment and not the 
order presented in the table. In the experiment, subjects had to make a choice between Option A 
(early reward) and Option B (late reward). For example, in the first set, subjects chose between 
receiving 12 yuan today and 13 yuan in four days. The reward amount varied from 9 to 21 yuan. 
The timing of the early reward was either today (i.e., on the day of the experiment) or in four 
days, and the timing of the late reward was four or eight days from the day of the experiment.
3 
The difference between the early and the late rewards was one, three, or five yuan.
4 
<Table 2 to be here> 
Two experimenters were sent to each household to conduct the experiment. After agreeing to 
participate, the two spouses were separated into two rooms. Once they were seated, the 
instructions were read out by the experimenters. Throughout the experiment, the subjects 
completed the tasks step by step by following the experimental instructions. The whole 
experiment consisted of four parts. In Part 1, each spouse individually answered a detailed 
                                                 
3 It is possible that subjects have strong preferences for receiving the money today because of trust issues. As 
explained later, we used a signed certificate from Peking University containing information on when and how 
participants would be paid if they chose the late reward. We believe that this was important for the subjects’ ability 
to trust us that they would be paid. Moreover, in the results section we show that there is no sign of present-biased 
preferences within the time frame of the experiment, i.e., time preferences do not depend on whether we compare 
today to 4 days, or 4 days to 8 days. We designed the time preference experiment with only a few days’ delay 
between the early and late rewards mainly for two reasons. First, the short time horizon could avoid any concerns 
about inflation. Second, for practical reasons, choosing a short delay allowed us to keep the time that interviewers 
had to be in the field reasonably short (since they could bring the money to relatively close-by villages while running 
experiments in another village on the same day), thus significantly reducing the costs of the experiment. 
4 Given the design of the experiment, with a very short time difference between the early and late reward, the 
implicit annual discount rates were very high. However, the main aim of our experiment is to investigate the relative 
influences of husbands and wives in household decision-making, rather than estimating discount rates per se. 7 
 
questionnaire about socio-demographic characteristics, health status, and social capital. In Part 2, 
each spouse made individual decisions in the time preference experiment. In Part 3, the two 
spouses were reunited and had to give agreed-upon answers regarding the financial situation of 
the household and some additional household characteristics. Part 4 was identical to Part 2, 
except that the spouses had to make joint decisions after reaching an agreement on which options 
to choose for each of the 18 choice tasks. Note that each part was introduced sequentially only 
after the previous part had been completed. 
When introducing Part 4, participants were informed that the reward amount in the selected 
option would be paid to each of the spouses. This procedure was used to keep each spouse’s 
direct monetary incentives constant across Parts 2 and 4. Both experimenters were present during 
the joint decision experiment and they recorded a joint decision only after both spouses had given 
their consent. Both in Part 2 and in Part 4, participants were instructed in advance that one of the 
18 decisions in each part would be played out for real at the end of the experiment by drawing 
one card from a deck of cards, numbered 1 to 18. Subjects were also informed that they would be 
paid directly after completion of the whole survey and experiment if they chose a reward amount 
due “today”, while if they chose to be paid later (in four or eight days), they would be given a 
signed certificate by Peking University indicating the amount of money redeemable on the 
specified date. The payment would be delivered to their home by a project assistant at a time of 
day specified by the couple and they needed to show the certified paper in order to receive the 
payment. In Part 2, it was stressed that the payment for Part 2 would be made in private for 
husbands and wives in different rooms.  
 8 
 
3. Empirical model 
The data needed to measure the relative influence within a household comprise both the 
individual preferences of each spouse and the joint decisions of the couple. In the experiment, we 
observe the choices between alternatives rather than the preferences directly. The alternatives in 
turn can be described by a set of attributes, i.e., the reward amounts at certain times. We analyze 
the decision problem with a random utility framework developed by McFadden (1973). The 
utility function consists of two parts, an observable non-stochastic part, v, and an unobservable 
stochastic part, ε. If there are only two alternatives to choose between, then the probability of 
choosing alternative A for individual i in choice situation j is equal to the probability that 
individual  i’s utility from choosing alternative A is higher than the utility from choosing 
alternative B: 
[ ] ijB jB i ijA jA i ij X v X v P A P ε ε + > + = ) ( ) ( ) ( ,  (1)
where  X  denotes a vector of attributes of the alternatives. From the experiment, we want to 
measure the relative influence of the wife (W) and of the husband (H). In order to estimate this, 
we first need to estimate the individual preferences of the husband and of the wife separately. For 
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where alternative A is the early reward and alternative B is the late reward. Assuming utility is a 
linear function of the timing and amount of the rewards, the probabilistic model can be rewritten 
as 
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i α  is introduced to allow for a preference for early or late rewards that is not explained 
by the difference in timing and amount of the rewards. This could be an indication of a general 
preference for early rewards or simply a reflection of a left-hand or right-hand side preference 
when choosing the options.  
In the experiment, there are two possible levels of the timing of the early rewards – zero 
(now) and four days from now – and two possible levels of the timing of the late rewards – four 
days and eight days from now. In order to allow for non-linear effects of the timing of the 
rewards, and the reward structure we express the probability of choosing an early reward as 
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where D08 is a dummy variable equal to one when the early reward is received today and the late 
reward in eight days from now, and D48 a dummy variable equal to one when the early reward is 
received in four days and the late reward in eight days from now. 






ij ε ε η − = , and β  and γ  are parameters to be estimated. 
Since the reference case is a reward today versus a reward in four days, we expect that 
W
i08 β  is 
negative. If 
W
i48 β  is not significantly different from zero, then subjects do not suffer from a present 
bias within the time frame of the experiment (see, e.g., McClure et al., 2004, 2007, and Read et 
al., 1999). The sign of the coefficient of the differences in rewards, 
W
i2 γ , is expected to be 
negative. Moreover, the size of the early reward,  jA amount , is included in the model to control 
for a possible income effect. 
For a husband in household i, the probability of choosing an early reward in choice situation 
j is expressed in the same way as 10 
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.  (5)
The preferences of a wife and a husband can be estimated with standard discrete choice models. 
However, we apply random parameter models where the coefficients of the attributes are 
assumed to be randomly distributed due to unobserved preference heterogeneity (see Train, 
2003). In order to facilitate estimations, we keep the intercept as a fixed parameter. Using random 
parameter models enables us to estimate individual-specific predicted choice probabilities for 
each choice situation, denoted as 
H
ij P ˆ and 
W
ij P ˆ , even if we do not include individual characteristics 
as explanatory variables. We assume that all the random parameters are normally distributed. 
Since we have repeated observations, we further assume that the random parameters are constant 
across choice sets for a given respondent, i.e., the individual time preferences are stable. Finally, 
we assume that the error term is normally distributed so that we can estimate random parameter 
binary probit models. The models are estimated using simulated maximum likelihood.  
In the next step, we estimate a similar model explaining the choices in the joint part of the 
experiment. In this model, the probability of choosing the early reward is again a function of the 
attributes of the alternatives. In addition, we include two variables reflecting the individual 
preferences of the spouses. The obvious choice might seem to be the individual choices made by 
the spouses. Yet, the main drawback of using individual choices is that they reveal little 
information about the strength of the preferences. We therefore use the predicted probabilities of 
the spouses’ individual choices (
H
ij P ˆ and 
W
ij P ˆ ) instead. By doing this, we can measure the 
influences of the spouses’ preferences on the joint decisions. The probability of choosing the 
early reward (A) for household i in choice situation j in the joint time preference experiment is 
then specified as 11 
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This model is also estimated as a random parameter binary probit model. All the random 
parameters are again specified as normally distributed and assumed to be constant across the 
choice situations for a given household. 
What we are interested in here is obtaining household-specific estimates of the two 
parameters relating to the absolute influences of the husband and the wife on the joint decisions, 
i.e., the parameters of the predicted individual choice probabilities. The ratio of these two 
parameters can then be used to identify the relative influences of the husband and wife on the 
joint decisions. In the following analyses, we focus on the relative influence of the spouses, i.e., 












If the ratio is larger than one, then the wife has a stronger influence on the joint decisions than the 
husband, and vice versa. 
In order to obtain the estimates of 
W
i δˆ  and 
H
i δˆ , we rely on simulation, i.e., we estimate 
distributions of the parameters rather than individual-specific parameters. This is done by using 
Bayes Theorem (Train, 2003). If  ) , | ( θ β i y h  denotes the distribution of a parameter vector β  
conditional on a sequence of choices ( i y ) and the population parameter (θ ), Train (2003) shows 
that the mean β  for an individual i making a specific choice is 
[] ∫ ⋅ = ) , | ( , | θ β β θ β i i y h y E
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where  ) | ( θ β f  is the distribution of β in the population. The expression in equation (8) is thus 
an estimate of the parameter for a particular individual (in our case a spouse or a household). This 
estimate in turn comes from the estimated population distribution that we obtain with the random 
parameter models. This expression does not have a closed form and we therefore again have to 

























r β  is the r-th draw from the population density  ) , | ( θ β i y h . 
We are primarily interested in the distribution of the ratio of the two parameters relating to 
the influences of the husband and the wife on the joint decisions. However, we are also interested 
in finding household characteristics that can explain the variation of the variable  i Influence  
among the households. In the final part of the analysis, we estimate a truncated regression model 
where the relative influence is explained by a number of individual and household characteristics, 
such as education level of the spouses, absolute income, relative income contribution of the 
spouses, age of the spouses, and length of marriage. 
 
4. Results  
Table 3 reports the frequency with which husbands, wives, and couples choose the early rewards. 
The aggregate data in Table 3 shows that husbands on average choose early rewards more often 
than wives, and that the share of early rewards in the joint choices is often closer to the average 
of the husbands’ choices. However, chi-square tests do not reveal any significant distributional 13 
 
differences in the choices between husbands, wives, and joint choices.
5 More importantly, this is 
only a description of the average choices, and it provides no information on what happened at the 
level of single households.  
<Table 3 to be here> 
In eight households, the husband and the wife made exactly the same choices in all 18 choice 
situations. We will exclude these households from the rest of the analyses since it is impossible to 
obtain any information about the individual spouses’ relative influences on the joint decisions 
from these observations. This leaves us with 93 married couples for estimation and analysis.  
Now we turn to the econometric model to analyze the individual and household decisions. 
The first step of the analysis is to estimate the random parameter models for the individual 
choices. We estimate random parameter binary probit models. All models are estimated in Nlogit 
4.0 using 500 Halton draws. The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 4. Not all 
mean coefficients are significant, but all estimated standard deviations are, indicating that we 
capture unobserved heterogeneity both among husbands and among wives. The constant is 
positive and significant for both groups, which indicates that there is a preference for early 
rewards not related to the variation in the timing of the rewards and the amounts of the rewards. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable for four days versus eight days is insignificant for both 
husbands and wives, and since the reference case is today versus in four days, this is an 
indication that the subjects do not have present-biased preferences within the time frame of the 
experiment. However, the coefficient of the dummy for today versus in eight days is significantly 
positive meaning that, not surprisingly, when the time difference between the early and the late 
                                                 
5 We conduct chi-square tests for each of the 18 choice sets, and the results of the 54 chi-square tests reveal that there 
are no statistically significant differences between the different decision situations (husbands vs. wives, husbands vs. 
joint decisions, wives vs. joint decisions). 14 
 
reward increases, the likelihood of choosing the early reward increases. The size of the early 
reward has no significant impact on choices, which implies no income effect regarding the initial 
endowment of early rewards in the experiment. Yet, the difference between the early and the late 
reward has a significant impact on choices. As expected, if the difference between the late and 
the early reward increases, the likelihood of choosing the early reward decreases.  
The next models to be estimated deal with the probability of choosing the early reward in the 
joint decisions. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 4. The first model does 
not include the predicted probabilities of the husband and the wife. In terms of significance, the 
first model’s results are the same as the two individual estimates. There is a preference for early 
rewards; longer delay in late rewards and smaller reward differences between early and late 
rewards increase the likelihood of choosing the early rewards. In the second model, the predicted 
choice probabilities of the husband and wife are used as explanatory variables in addition to the 
characteristics of the alternatives. The parameters of the predicted probabilities of the husband 
and of the wife are highly significant, indicating that, on average, both the husband’s and the 
wife’s preferences influence the joint decisions. The mean estimated coefficient is larger for 
husbands, suggesting that, on average, husbands have a stronger influence on joint decisions than 
wives. The mean estimate of the relative influence is 0.79; using a t-test, this ratio is statistically 
significantly different from one (p-value = 0.032). The relative influence measure actually shows 
how much more influence husbands have, since the ratio is directly related to the ratio of the 
marginal effects. An increase in the predicted individual probabilities of choosing the early 
reward increases the probability that the early reward is chosen in the joint decisions for both 
husbands and wives, but the increase in the joint probability for wives is on average only 79% of 
the increase for husbands. 
<Table 4 to be here> 15 
 
The next step is to generate household-specific mean estimates of the two parameters related 
to the influence of the husband and the wife, and then calculate the ratio of the wife’s and the 
husband’s predicted probability parameters for each household. If the ratio is larger than one, the 
wife has more influence than the husband, and vice versa. The mean ratio is 0.71, the maximum 
2.42, and the minimum 0.26. Using a t-test the ratio is significantly different from one (p-value = 
0.000). The estimated mean based on the individual estimates is slightly lower than the 
population mean of 0.79. The ratio based on the individual estimates is higher than one for 10% 
of the households, implying that in only 10% of households, the wife has more influence than the 
husband on joint decisions. A plot of the distribution of the relative influences on the joint 
decisions is presented in Figure 1. 
<Figure 1 to be here> 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the estimated random parameter model does not predict a large 
variation in the relative influences on joint decisions. However, it is still interesting to explore 
which household characteristics can explain the variation. This is done by estimating a truncated 
regression model (truncated at zero) with the relative influence as the dependent variable. We 
include a number of household characteristics that could explain the relative influence, such as 
household income, length of marriage, and having children. In addition, we include a number of 
characteristics that have the potential to shift the relative influence of spouses: a wife who is 
more educated than the husband, a wife who is older than the husband, and husband’s parents 
living in the same household.
6 Finally, we include a self-reported measure of the influence on 
small investment decisions in the household. The results of the truncated regression model are 
presented in Table 5.  
                                                 
6 In rural China, couples live either alone or with the husband’s parents. Couples hardly ever live with the wives’ 
parents. 16 
 
<Table 5 to be here> 
Given the relatively small variation in the dependent variable, it is difficult to explain the 
variation in the relative influence on joint decisions within households. However, three 
characteristics have significant effects. First, if the household is richer, then the wife has a 
stronger influence on joint decisions. Second, if the wife is older than the husband, she has a 
stronger influence. Third, the relative influence is correlated with a couple’s self-report on who is 
in charge of small investment decisions. In a household where the husband typically makes the 
household’s small investment decisions, the husband’s influence on the joint decisions in the 
experiment is stronger. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have measured the relative influence of husbands and wives on joint household 
decisions in a field experiment conducted in the homes of 101 married couples in a poor, rural 
region of China. The average earnings from the experiment were equal to the average pay for two 
days of work. Hence, participants had strong incentives to make decisions that corresponded to 
their preferences. The experimental task was to make inter-temporal decisions in which an 
earlier, but smaller, reward could be traded for a later, but larger, reward. Both spouses had to 
make decisions, first individually and then jointly. In general, we found that participants were 
rather impatient, both in the individual and the joint decisions. Yet, the focus of our paper has 
been to estimate how the individual preferences of husbands and wives determine the joint 
household decisions. 
As a first step in understanding these household decisions, we aimed at disentangling the 
husband’s and the wife’s influences on joint inter-temporal decisions and determining the factors 17 
 
that affect the relative influences. As our methodological approach, we applied random parameter 
models that have allowed us, first, to estimate the time preferences of spouses separately and, 
second, to use the separate estimates as explanatory variables in a model explaining each 
household’s joint decisions. Hence, the random parameter model provides a very suitable tool to 
estimate the influences of spouses in a household. 
We have found that, on average, husbands have a stronger influence on joint decisions than 
wives. This reflects the traditional Chinese norm that husbands are mainly in charge of household 
decisions. Our estimations reveal that in 90% of households, the joint household decisions are 
more influenced by the husband’s individual time preferences than the wife’s. It is also 
remarkable that across the 93 households used in the analysis, we find relatively small variation 
in the relative influences, suggesting that the spouses’ relative influences are persistent. Despite 
the small variation, it is interesting to note the factors that have a significant influence on the 
spouses’ relative strength in influencing the joint decisions. Our most important finding in this 
respect is the fact that in richer households, the relative influence of spouses shifts significantly in 
favor of the wife’s time preferences. This is a clear indication that (increasing) wealth improves 
the relative power of women in households. Moreover, we found that wives have more influence 
on joint decisions if they are older than their husbands. Finally, wives have more power in 
households where they are in charge of small investment decisions. The latter finding confirms 
earlier findings pointing to the importance of who is in charge of the household income. Previous 
studies have shown that changing who controls the income in a household leads to changes in 
patterns of consumption, savings, education for children or even survival rates of children (e.g., 
Thomas, 1994; Lundberg et al., 1997; and Qian, 2008). Based on our methodological approach, 
we were able to show that underlying this indirect evidence for the influence of income control 18 
 
on households’ economic behavior is the fact that controlling income allows wives to influence 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of household characteristics (N = 101 households) 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Income per capita 
Income per capita per year in 
Chinese yuan 
a 
4,203 8253  200  84,117 
Wife income 
contribution 
Wife’s share of the household 
income 
b 
0.418 0.152  0  1 
Length of marriage  
Number of years the couple has been 
married 
26.47 12.46  1  52 
Number of children  Number of children the couple have  2.675  1.401  0  7 
Notes: 
a This is the per capita average of all family members. 
b This is a joint self-reported measure, where both husband and wife had to agree about the income contribution of the 





Table 2. Description of the 18 pair-wise choices in the time preference experiment 
   Option A (early reward)     Option B (late reward) 
  Time Amount   Time Amount  Set 
   (days) (yuan)      (days) (yuan) 
1  0  12    4  13 
2  0  17    4  18 
3  0  11    4  14 
4  0  16    4  19 
5  0  10    4  15 
6  0  15    4  20 
7  0  11    8  12 
8  0  16    8  17 
9  0  10    8  13 
10   0  15    8  18 
11   0  9    8  14 
12   0  14    8  19 
13   4  13    8  14 
14   4  18    8  19 
15   4  12    8  15 
16   4  17    8  20 
17   4  11    8  16 
18     4  16     8  21 






Table 3. Frequencies of early reward choices in the time preference experiment (N = 101 
households) 
   Option A      Option B    
Set 
 (early  reward)   (late  reward) 
Share of early reward choices 
 Time  Amount   Time  Amount 
  
 (days)  (yuan)  (days)  (yuan) 
Husband   Wife  Joint 
1     0  12     4  13    0.73  0.67  0.79 
2  0  17  4  18  0.74  0.64  0.79 
3  0  11  4  14  0.38  0.28  0.38 
4  0  16  4  19  0.42  0.38  0.39 
5  0  10  4  15  0.24  0.13  0.19 
6  0  15  4  20  0.28  0.17  0.21 
7  0  11  8  12  0.75  0.70  0.81 
8  0  16  8  17  0.72  0.68  0.81 
9  0  10  8  13  0.57  0.51  0.56 
10   0  15   8  18  0.56  0.52  0.54 
11   0  9    8  14  0.40  0.30  0.30 
12   0  14   8  19  0.38  0.33  0.28 
13   4  13   8  14  0.64  0.61  0.76 
14   4  18   8  19  0.72  0.67  0.76 
15   4  12   8  15  0.52  0.35  0.46 
16   4  17   8  20  0.39  0.3  0.39 
17   4  11   8  16  0.32  0.19  0.22 
18     4  16     8  21    0.28  0.17  0.24  
Overall average share of early reward choices    0.50  0.42  0.49 






Table 4. Estimated results for random parameter binary probit models for husband, wife, and joint decisions 
   Husband  Wife  Joint 






(0.282) (0.306)  (0.429)  (0.446) 
0.025 0.002  0.302
* 0.266 
Dummy 4 vs. 8 days 






Dummy 0 vs. 8 days 
(0.136) (0.132)  (0.196)  (0.155) 
-0.010 -0.007  0.012  -0.035 
AmountEarly 






AmountLate – AmountEarly 
(0.050) (0.044)  (0.112)  (0.072) 
3.751
*** 




Wife: predicted probability       
(0.221) 
Standard deviation parameters             
0.216
** 0.089  0.216  0.227 
Dummy 4 vs. 8 days 






Dummy 0 vs. 8days 













AmountLate – AmountEarly 
(0.042) (0.024)  (0.053)  (0.034) 
1.713
*** 




Wife: predicted probability       
(0.156) 
No. of households  93  93  93  93 
Pseudo R2  0.45  0.39  0.54   0.39 
Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients. 
*, **, and *** denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 26 
 
 
Table 5. Marginal effects of the truncated regression model on the relative influence of the wife 
Variable     Description (Mean value)     Mar. eff. 





   0.076
**  Log Equivalence 
scaled income   
Log of equivalence scaled household income in Chinese yuan. 
Equivalence scale = (Adults + 0.5 x Kids)^0.75 (9.03)    (0.035) 
   -0.314  Wife income 
contribution  
Wife’s share of total household income (0.40) 
 (0.238) 
   0.005 
Length of marriage  
 
Number of years the couple has been married (24.81) 
 (0.003) 
   0.018 
Have children 
 
= 1 if couple has at least one child (0.42) 
 (0.070) 
   0.049 
Wife more educated 
 
= 1 if wife has a higher education than the husband (0.14) 
 (0.096) 




= 1 if wife is older than husband (0.29) 
 (0.074) 
   -0.072
* 
Influence on small 
investment decisions   
When it comes to small investment decisions, for example 
buying equipment for the house, would you say that: 1 = mainly 
wife decides, 2= decide jointly, 3 = mainly husband decides 
(2.17)  
 (0.044) 
   -0.129  Living with 
husband’s parents    
= 1 if the couple is living with the husband’s parents (0.24) 
   (0.083) 
No. of households           93 
Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are the standard errors of the coefficients. 
*,
 **, and






Figure 1. Distribution of relative influences on joint decisions 
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Appendix: Experimental script for eliciting intertemporal choices individually 
and jointly 
 
Separate decisions (for each of the two spouses respectively) 
“In this experiment, we will ask you to make decisions between earning money at different points 
in time. You will be asked to make 18 decisions. Let us look at the first decision [show card 1]. 
In this case you can either receive 12 yuan today if you choose alternative 1 or receive 13 yuan in 
four days if you choose alternative 2.  
 
At the end of this survey, when your household has answered all the questions, you will draw a 
card one time for this part to determine the one of the 18 decisions to be actually paid. Even 
though you will make 18 decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earning, but you 
will not know in advance which decision will be used. Each decision has an equal chance of 
being used in the end.  
 
Please note that if a time today is chosen, you will receive the money right after the survey. If a 
time different from today is chosen, we will write this “We owe you paper” [Show the 
certification to the subject]. This is a legally binding paper from Peking University assuring you 
that payment will be done in the future. In practical terms, we will come back to your household 
at the time chosen to pay you the money.” 
 
“Do you have any questions?” [Experimenters need leave enough time and opportunity to the 
subjects] If NOT, “Shall we proceed with the 18 decisions?” 
 
Joint decisions 
“In this part of experiment, we will ask you to make decisions between earning money at 
different points in time. But this time we want you to make decisions together. The questions are 
exactly the same as before.  
 
The way to determine your payments is the same as before, but this time each of you will receive 
the amount of money stated in the chosen alternative. That is, you will draw a card one time to 
determine the one of the 18 decisions to be used. If a time today is chosen, you will receive the 
money right after the survey. If a time different from today is chosen, we will write the ‘We owe 
you paper’ to both of you, and will come back to your household at the time chosen to pay both 
of you the money.” 
 
“Do you have any questions?” [Experimenters need leave enough time and opportunity to the 
subjects] If NOT, “Shall we proceed with the 18 decisions?” 
 
 